Immortality has primarily been an issue discussed among philosophers. Thus, in analyzing the case for the permanent extinction of the personality at death, it is convenient to address the philosophical arguments before looking at the scientific evidence for annihilation. Logical arguments, if successful, are decisive; thus, not even an appeal to faith could vindicate a belief that is incoherent because no one would understand what it is that one claims to believe. The extinction hypothesis is supported by the conceptual problems that plague the notions of disembodied minds, astral bodies, and resurrection.
Belief in survival in the form of disembodied minds presupposes that people possess an immaterial, nonspatial substance which constitutes the personality. One objection to this view, that human beings are essentially corporeal, is stated by Corliss Lamont:
Belief in survival in the form of disembodied minds presupposes that people possess an immaterial, nonspatial substance which constitutes the personality. One objection to this view, that human beings are essentially corporeal, is stated by Corliss Lamont:
Many philosophers have argued the bodily continuity is more essential to personal identity than memory because memory claims can be true or false; thus memory in itself is not enough to make you the same person over time--bodily continuity, they argue, is required .
As John Hick has argued, whether or not the replica can be identified with the original person is a matter for decision. The "replica objection" assumes that someone's being me is a fact that is independent of the existence of any other people. In other words, since the replica would not be me if I existed and had not died, there is no room for calling the replica me after the dissolution of my original body. This assumption, however, is invalid. Van Inwagen seems to be playing linguistic games when he argues that reconstituting the person from the same matter would be a replica. The manuscript God creates has the same causal history as St. Augustine's manuscript since they are materially continuous with each other, thus they are the same manuscript. That a replica is materially continuous with the original person indicates identity, but bodily continuity is not necessary for personal identity. If I have my car repaired and every single part is gradually replaced, is the resulting car the same car? Indeed it is. If every single part was disassembled and at some later date the car was reassembled completely from different parts, but with the same exact material and quality and in the same exact configuration as the original, the resulting car would be the same car. It is the same car because it is the closest-continuer of the original[2]. If the original exists and an exact replica is created, then the original would be the closest-continuer and the replica would not be the same car. That the original is destroyed does matter. If my body dies and a replica is created, there is room for calling it me; if my body lives and a replica is created, there is no room for calling it me. Thus the replica objection fails to rule out the possibility of resurrection.
Conceding that bodily resurrection is logically possible, however, is not saying much. On scientific grounds the belief that a person whose remains have turned to ash or been absorbed into other organisms will actually be regenerated as a fully-functional replica is incredible. To use one of Kai Nielsen's examples, such an event is as unlikely as a man growing an aluminum exoskeleton while his bones turn into iron rods (Nielsen 240). While we can imagine what it would be like for these kinds of events to happen by forming a general picture of them, we have no idea how such events could actually occur when it comes down to their details (Nielsen 240-41). Providing a detailed explanation of how a resurrection replica could come into existence is about as promising as explaining how astronauts could build a space station in the center of the Sun. Such events are logical possibilities only because they are not self-contradictory in the way that the notion of a round square is. But they are not real scientific possibilities.
Those who believe in bodily resurrection would probably concede that this is all very unlikely in the absence of a miracle from God. But they would argue that resurrection is not unlikely if the possibility of divine intervention is allowed. Resurrection would require an act of God, of course, but we have no more grounds for believing that an intelligent Creator would resurrect dead human beings than we have for believing that he would resurrect the dinosaurs. This is the case because we have no reliable way of determining how likely or unlikely any event is once supernatural intervention is allowed. As a consequence of this, resurrection of the dead is just as likely given supernatural intervention as is growing an aluminum exoskeleton while one's bones turn into iron rods.
Another problem for survival in any form is the age regression problem.
Conceding that bodily resurrection is logically possible, however, is not saying much. On scientific grounds the belief that a person whose remains have turned to ash or been absorbed into other organisms will actually be regenerated as a fully-functional replica is incredible. To use one of Kai Nielsen's examples, such an event is as unlikely as a man growing an aluminum exoskeleton while his bones turn into iron rods (Nielsen 240). While we can imagine what it would be like for these kinds of events to happen by forming a general picture of them, we have no idea how such events could actually occur when it comes down to their details (Nielsen 240-41). Providing a detailed explanation of how a resurrection replica could come into existence is about as promising as explaining how astronauts could build a space station in the center of the Sun. Such events are logical possibilities only because they are not self-contradictory in the way that the notion of a round square is. But they are not real scientific possibilities.
Those who believe in bodily resurrection would probably concede that this is all very unlikely in the absence of a miracle from God. But they would argue that resurrection is not unlikely if the possibility of divine intervention is allowed. Resurrection would require an act of God, of course, but we have no more grounds for believing that an intelligent Creator would resurrect dead human beings than we have for believing that he would resurrect the dinosaurs. This is the case because we have no reliable way of determining how likely or unlikely any event is once supernatural intervention is allowed. As a consequence of this, resurrection of the dead is just as likely given supernatural intervention as is growing an aluminum exoskeleton while one's bones turn into iron rods.
Another problem for survival in any form is the age regression problem.
When an old man dies, what kind of consciousness is supposed to survive? Is it his consciousness as it was just before death, which may perhaps have become imbecile? Or is it the consciousness of his mature middle age? Or is it the infant mind that he had when he was a baby? The point of these questions is not that we do not know the answers... The point is that all possible answers are equally senseless... [W]ill the old man who dies suddenly revert to his middle years after death? And will the infant who dies suddenly become mature? (Edwards, "Introduction" 60).
The conceptual problems for the three common vehicles for survival make survival a highly implausible possibility. Disembodied existence is inconceivable, astral bodies are too ill-defined or undefined to warrant their acceptance, and literal resurrection cannot account for the fact that many people who have shared the same matter cannot all be resurrected of that matter. There are no logical problems for the prospect of a resurrection replica, but given our past experience, resurrection is an extremely unlikely prospect for the future.
The conceptual problems for the three common vehicles for survival make survival a highly implausible possibility. Disembodied existence is inconceivable, astral bodies are too ill-defined or undefined to warrant their acceptance, and literal resurrection cannot account for the fact that many people who have shared the same matter cannot all be resurrected of that matter. There are no logical problems for the prospect of a resurrection replica, but given our past experience, resurrection is an extremely unlikely prospect for the future.
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